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ASSISTED NONCOITAL REPRODUCTION:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
George P. Smith, 11*
I. INTRODUCTION
An estimated two hundred conception clinics around the United States cur-
rently serve two million couples seeking assistance in combatting infertility.1
These couples expend nearly one billion dollars to arrest their condition. Tragi-
cally, the national "take home baby rate" from these clinics is between eleven
and fourteen percent.2 From this, the question that becomes uppermost in the
hearts and minds of many is whether there is a fundamental or international
human right to health assistance in biological reproduction. In recognizing or
structuring such a right, would the state be obligated to spend any and all
reasonable amounts of money in order to validate the procreative rights of all
women-regardless of marital status? Consistent with the fundamental consti-
tutional right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, should the state
enforce its protective powers vis-a-vis infants at the moment of conception or
at some point later in their embryonic development?
In 1983, Sir Harry Gibbs, Chief Justice of Australian High Court, ruled
"that a foetus has no right of its own until it is born and has a separate exis-
tence from its mother." 3 The common law tied the commencement of life to
the time when an unborn first moved in the womb-or, in other words, when it
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M., Columbia University. Professor of Law,
The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. The research and writing of
this article began in the summer of 1989 when I was a visting fellow in Law and
Medicine at Hughes Hall, Cambridge University, England.
I Sanders, Whose Lives Are These? A Judge Sets A Pro-Life Precedent for Em-
bryos, TIME, Oct. 2, 1989, at 19.
2 USA Today, Aug. 7, 1989, at 1A, col. 3.
3 Attorney General for Queensland ex rel. Kerr v. T., 57 A.L.J.R. 285 (Austl.
1983).
In Canada, Justice Matheson of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench held that
a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the law. Therefore, it is not within the
scope of the term "everyone" as used in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
which provides that "[e]veryone has the right to life ... and the right not to be de-
prived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Borow-
ski v. Attorney-General of Canada, 4 D.L.R. 4th 112, 121 (1983) (quoting CAN.
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 7).
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quickened.4 Thus, only after the fetus quickened could its destruction be clas-
sified as murder.5 In the United States, the issue of when individuality is es-
tablished biologically and when the law should, accordingly, protect such indi-
viduals, was determined by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.6 In Roe, the
Court essentially held that a fetus does not receive the full protection of the
law until it is born. 7
In September 1989, a judge of the Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Dis-
trict of Tennessee ruled that life begins at the moment of conception.6 The
court held that seven cryogenically preserved in vitro embryos were children,
and not personal property. Accordingly, the court placed the embryos in the
custodial care of the woman who, during marriage, produced the eggs subse-
quently fertilized by her then-husband." The only support the court provided
for its momentus decision was a reference to the definition of "conception" in
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary.' 0 Apparently, the court was unper-
suaded by the authoratitive texts and treatises relevant to the field. Instead, it
relied primarily on the testimony of eight witnesses, particularly that of Dr.
Jerome Lajeune, a member of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of
Paris and the Pontifical Academy of Science at the Vatican."
I Gavigan, The Criminal Sanction as it Relates to Human Reproduction: The Gen-
esis of the Statutory Prohibition of Abortion, 5 J. LEGAL HIsT. 20 (1984).
5 Id. at 21.
6 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
It is only when the fetus reaches a "compelling" point of viability or when it "pre-
sumably has the capability of meaningfull life outside the mother's womb," the state's
interest in protecting fetal existence will be asserted. Id. at 163-64. It is at the third
trimester of development that the state's interest becomes controlling. See King, The
Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, in 1
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD 110 (G. Smith
ed. 1982).
8 Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 17 (Tenn. Cir. Sept. 21, 1989) (1989 WL
140495)(This case was reversed and remanded by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in
September 1990; see infra note 12 and accompanying text.)
The State of Louisiana appears to be the only state that has legislatively determined
that:
A viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which shall not be
intentionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical person or through the
actions of any other such person. An in vitro fertilized human ovum that fails to
develop further over a thirty-six hour period except when the embryo is in a state
of cryopreservation, is considered non-viable and is not considered a juridical
person.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN., § 129 (West Supp. 1990).
1 See Davis, No. E-14496 at 20. See also Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1989, at A13, col. 1
(discussing Judge Young's decision in Davis to grant Mrs. Davis custody of the seven
"embryo children").
10 Davis, No. E-14496 at 17 n.45.
" Id. at 15.
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On September 13, 1990, however, the Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled
that awarding the seven fertilized ova to the woman would constitute "imper-
missible state action" by violating the former husband's "constitutionally pro-
tected right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place."12 The
court based its opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court recognition that the deci-
sion to "bear or beget a child" is one of protected choice by the Constitution.13
Consistent also with state law which recognizes legal protections extending
only to viable fetuses, the court remanded the case to the trial court directing
a new judgment to reflect the Appeals Court decision, granting both parties
joint control and an equal voice in the disposition of the ova. The Court thus
held that just as it would be repugnant constitutionally to order the woman to
implant the fertilized ova against her will, it would be equally repugnant to
order her former husband to bear the psychological, if not legal, burdens of
forced paternity. 4
The dilemma of frozen embryos presents no clear course of action for easy
resolution.15 Yet, in the state of Victoria, Australia, alone, there are said to be
some two thousand embryos cryogenically preserved.' 6 Throughout Australia
as many as ten thousand such frozen embryos may exist.' 7 Fritze Honduis, the
Deputy Director of Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, has suggested that
upwards of twenty thousand embryos are frozen throughout Europe. 8
The fact that no clear consensus is evolving on even how to begin a dialogue
about frozen embryos let alone develop a legal response-mechanism to deal
with the situation, does not bode well for clarity and direction in this area.
Indeed, "the ethical debate is even less focused than the unending rhetorical
battle over abortion."' 9 Before the legislature and the courts are called upon to
develop a definitive framework for principled decision making, objective "hard
thinking" is required of the major cross-disciplinary participants in this un-
folding drama.20
The new reproductive biology promises untold opportunities for resolving
heart-breaking problems of infertility and will expand the meaning of
"procreational autonomy" for women. It also presents difficult problems for
12 Davis v. Davis, C/A No. 180, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990).
13 Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
14 Davis, C/A No. 180 at 6.
15 See Curriden, Frozen Embryos-The New Frontier, 75 A.B.A. J. 68 (1989) (dis-
cussing the history of Davis and the "embryonic" state of the law in this area). See
also Wash. Post, June 26, 1989, at B1, col. 1.; Wash. Post, Aug. 15, 1989, at A19, col.
I (discussing the trend towards using in vitro embryos as weapons"in divorce cases).
11 Pirrie, Re-inventing the Law of Human Life, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1989, at A26,
col. 3 (discussing the status and ethics of IVF research in Australia and Europe).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Elson, The Rights of Frozen Embryos, TIME, July 24, 1989, at 63.
20 Id.
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the physician, lawyer, ethicist, theologian and, for that matter, the average
person. 21
This Article will explore, through comparative analysis, the major issues
confronting the use of assisted noncoital reproductive technologies in the
United States and abroad. The Article seeks to provide a multi-faceted con-
struct that will promote informed and enlightened decision-making devoid of
as much emotion and sentimentality as possible. The evolving-indeed,
fluid-parameters of the new reproductive biology defy a single definitive re-
sponse. This analysis is premised on the belief that medical and scientific in-
terventions that minimize human suffering (genetically or otherwise induced)
and maximize quality of life should be pursued. Most always, the untold bene-
fits of noncoital reproduction outweigh the costs attendant with its experimen-
tation and use.
II. THE ETHICS OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
Typically, the in vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo transfer processes be-
gins with drug therapy to produce super-ovulation in a woman. Through a
procedure called laparoscopy, the resulting eggs are removed from the wo-
man's reproductive tract and then fertilized. An embryo is then implanted in
the woman's uterus and, if the implantation is successful, carried to term. The
remaining embryos are stored, either for future implantation should the first
attempt fail, or for use in scientific or medical experiments. Alternatively, IVF
may be used without embryo transfer to produce embryos solely for experi-
mental purposes.
Attention is now drawn to what might be termed as the "ethical morality"
of in vitro fertilization, a discussion which explores the benefits and the harms
of IVF use.22 Ethical complexities attend each of the many variations on the
basic IVF theme. For example, when artificial insemination is used to fertilize
a married woman's egg with the sperm of a man other than her husband be-
cause her husband's sperm is defective, a serious ethical issue is posed. Simi-
21 See G. SMITH, THE NEW BIOLOGY, ch. 11 (1989). See also Smith, Uncertainities
on the Spiral Staircase: Metaethics and 'the New Biology, 41 PHAROS MED. J. 10
(1978); Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEo.
L. REV. 697 (1976); Noonan, Abortion and the Catholic Church: A Summary History,
12 NAT. L. F. 85 (1968).
22 The following sources serve as references for the presentation of arguments oppos-
ing and favoring the use of in vitro fertilization: MAKING BABIES: THE TEST TUBE AND
CHRISTIAN ETHICS (A. Nichols and T. Holgan eds. 1984); R. MCCORMICK, How
BRAVE A NEw WORLD? chs. 1, 16 (1981); TEST-TUBE BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL
QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES (W. Walters and P.
Singer eds. 1982) [hereinafter TEST-TUBE BABIES]; M. TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFAN-
TICIDE (1983); Harris, In Vitro Fertilization: The Ethical Issues, 33 PHIL. Q. 217
(1983); Studdard, The Morality of In Vitro Fertilization, 5 HUMAN LIFE REV. 41
(1979); Tiefel, Human In Vitro Fertilization: A Conservative View, J. A.M.A. 3235
(1982).
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larly, ethical issues arise when a third party surrogate carries an embryo to
term for a genetic mother or when a single woman seeks to avail herself of
IVF procedures. This Article will not probe all of the ethical issues raised by
IVF but will instead proceed selectively.
The most obvious benefit of IVF is that it circumvents infertility and allows
persons with a strong desire to have children to rear a family. If it is deter-
mined conclusively that frozen embryos can be used without damage to resul-
tant children, IVF could enable women who wish to pursue careers to bear
children using embryos created some years earlier, thereby reducing their
chance of producing a Down's syndrome child. Beyond family expansion, IVF
could be used to provide embryos for scientific and medical experiments. Em-
bryos could be used in infertility, genetic and cancer research; as a source of
obtaining embryonic tissue used in the treatment of diseases such as diabetes;
and to harvest organs for transplant.
There are several major objections to IVF. The first is that separating sex
from procreation is inherently wrong. IVF, followed by embryo transfer to the
uterus of the married woman, severs the connection between sex and reproduc-
tion. The second objection is that IVF is morally wrong because it involves an
abnormal risk of harm to the individual subsequently brought into existence.
Physical damage or abnormality (although not documented factually) could
result from IVF or from the subsequent transfer of the embryo to the woman's
womb. Furthermore, psychological harm might inure to an infant born of the
total process.
The third objection is that using IVF as a means to produce embryos for
experiments or as sources of tissues and organs subjects the embryo to pain.
This objection would have considerable merit where experiments were con-
ducted on substantially developed fetuses. When conducting such scientific in-
terventions with embryos in the first several weeks of their development, such
embryos probably do not experience pain, owing to the absence of a critical
nervous system.2"
The fourth objection is that although IVF may not be inherently wrong or
wrong because of its effects upon those immediately involved, it may be wrong
because of the "slippery slope" to which it is likely to lead. IVF together with
embryo transfer may lead to unimpeded use of surrogate mothers as substi-
tutes for genetic mothers; cause the dissolution of the family unit when women
who do not wish to marry or have sexual relations with a man use this tech-
nique; or even lead to the development of artifcial wombs, severing the
mother-child connection.2 4
23 M. TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE Chs. 5-7 (1983). See Robertson,
Rights, Symbolism and Public Policy in Fetal Tissue Transplants, HASTINGS CENTER
RPT. 5 (1988).
24 See TEST-TUBE BABIES, supra note 22, chs. 8, 11. See also Harvey, A Brief His-
tory of Medical Ethics from the Roman Catholic Perspective, in CATHOLIC PERSPEC-
TIVES ON MEDICAL MORALS at 129 (E. Pellegrino, J. Langan & J. Harvey eds. 1989).
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The strongest objection to the IVF process is that the unimplanted embryos
will eventually be destroyed, an action morally akin to abortion. When em-
bryos are not implanted in the woman's uterus, they must be used for scientific
experimentation, frozen, or destroyed. Generally, anti-abortionists view all sci-
entific experimentation using embryos as morally wrong since it necessarily
leads to the embryos' destruction. However, at a recent meeting of The Ameri-
can Society of Human Genitics, a new procedure was revealed which might
ease the high tension associated with prenatal genetic testing.25 This procedure
is designed to discover genetic defects in the human egg before fertilization.
Although considered promising, this procedure must itself undergo further
testing. Once validated, this could well take the "sting" out of some moral
objections to experimentation and use of IVF and embryo implants as assaults
on the right to life. Indeed, the General Counsel for the National Right to Life
expressed his opinion that the test was proper since it did not involve "the
taking of innocent human life."26
The freezing of embryos also poses difficult moral dilemmas. If frozen em-
bryos cannot be thawed successfully, a decision to thaw would lead to the
destruction of the embryos. Moreover, even if successful thawing can be ac-
complished, the decision to experiment, implant, or destroy arises again. Quite
clearly, the ethical dilemma involves very real problems. For example, would a
woman whose first implantation was successful be required to keep the re-
maining embryos frozen in perpetutity to avoid their destruction? The only
apparant way to resolve the uncertainty about freezing techniques would be to
continue with limited experimentation in the field, using lower animal life
forms.
A. Religious Overtones
Religious values have historically played an important part in public policy
debates.2 7 Indeed, the very "bedrock of moral order is religion."28 "And as
morality's foundation is religion, religion and politics are necessarily related.
We need religion as a guide; we need it because we are imperfect."2
Faith and religion have played a dynamic role in the political life of the
United States."° Today's commitment to democratic pluralism is nurtured and
sustained as a consequence of recognizing the inviolability of individual con-
science.,3 For some, politics and morality become inseparable.32 To exclude
25 Purvis, An Early Warning System, TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, at 56.
28 Id.
27 Hyde, Keeping God in the Closet: Some Thoughts on the Exorcism of Religious
Values from Public Life, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 33, 36 (1984).
28 Reagan, Politics and Morality are Inseparable, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. PoL'Y 7 (1984).
29 Id. at 10. See J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 156 (2d ed. 1969); R. NEUHAS,
THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984).
30 See Reagan, supra note 28, at 10.
31 See Hyde, supra note 27, at 43.
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societal values grounded in a religious base from the public arena would pose a
serious threat to the very principle of pluralism.38 What this commitment to
pluralism means, however, is that no definitive posture can ever emerge rela-
tive to assisted noncoital reproduction.
III. Jus COGENS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
Jus cogens ("cogent law") has often been used as a synonym for natural law
which draws upon either religious, secular or philosophical sources for its in-
herent validation.3 4 Once an international norm has become jus cogens, it is
binding upon all states whether or not they have objected in a persistent man-
ner to its development and application." Codified as such, its level of respect
and application becomes higher than customary law and, indeed, it becomes a
peremptory norm. 6
Recognized as the most fundamental of all rights, the right to life is consid-
ered a peremptory norm of general international law or jus cogens17 Thus, if
an unimplanted extracorporeal embryo created through IVF were recognized
as a legal person, it would in turn be recognized further as having a jus cogens
right to life and perhaps a right to mandated implantation in a uterus. Simi-
larly, any experimentation on the embryo could only be countenanced if,
through a surrogate decision maker, its informed consent were obtained
equitably.
Jus cogens norms are constantly evolving to reflect the developing interests
of the international community.38 Do such interests recognize the embryo as a
legal person or prohibit its use in the processes of IVF and scientific experi-
mentation as violative of ethical and legal standards of autonomy and distribu-
tive justice?
The proofs are still developing in this area. However, there is an unmistaka-
ble legislative movement abroad that recognizes the embryo as a respected
symbol of life, if not a legally protectable entity, and prohibits its use for con-
ceptive or scientific purposes.3 9 In the United States, all eyes are focused more
32 Reagan, supra note 28, at 10.
33 Hyde, supra note 27. See also, McCormick, Pluralism within the Church at 147,
Dougherty, One Church, Plural Theologies at 169 and Leavitt, Notes on a Catholic
Vision of Pluralism in CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE ON MEDICAL MORALS (E. Pellegrino,
J. Langand, J. Harvey eds. 1989).
"I Parker & Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 411, 414, 419 (1989).
31 Id. at 418.
36 A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 n.73
(1971).
11 Gormley, The Right to Life and The Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory
Norms of Jus Cogens, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 122 (B.
Ramcharan ed. 1985).
38 Parker & Neylon, supra note 34, at 427-28.
39 See infra part III.
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on the Supreme Court than on the state legislatures to resolve the status of the
embryo. If the right to life is recognized as a fundamental human right under
national or international law, embryos derived through IVF will be protected
against experimentation and may even have a claim for the resources neces-
sary to develop into human individuals.
Beyond the rights of IVF embryos, it can be asserted that women have a
right to avail themselves of the new ieproductive techniques including artificial
insemination, IVF and surrogate mother contracts. Under international law,
such a right might be found within the right to health.
As to assisted noncoital reproduction, a central question would be whether a
woman has a right to be free of government restrictions on access to the new
reproductive techniques.40 This issue has been explored elsewhere and is be-
yond the scope of this Article.41 Suffice it to note that if a standard of social
justice were enunciated that recognized this broad right to health as including
a co-ordinate right to participate in IVF programs, its full application would
still have to be determined, recognizing that reasonable self-discipline is a sine
qua non for the effective operation of such a right. In developing such a public
health policy, the interests of the whole society must be considered or balanced
against those members inconvenienced or "injured" by not being able to con-
ceive children in the normal manner.
If the state disregards the precepts of Social Justice, Usefulness, and Ne-
cessity there is danger that its activities may serve the wrong purpose.
The State then runs the risk of denegrating into a collective public-service
enterprise in which the citizen's demands become subject to galloping in-
flation and in which encouragement is given to the wishful notion that a
comprehensive government health service can and should be provided free
of charge.
42
For those who have called consistently for comprehensive federal legislation
in order to deal effectively with the dilemma here,43 such an effort was under-
taken by the European Parliament when it declared life is to be protected
from the moment of fertilization. 44 Of course, whether this action will be given
40 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly on December 10, 1948, states, "Everyone has the right to a standard
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.... ." See infra
note 54.
41 See, e.g.,, Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and The New Biology, 67 MARQ.
L. REV. 263 (1984); Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemi-
nation: A Call for Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 1 (1981).
42 von Wartburg, A Right to Health? in Colloquy, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A
HUMAN RIGHT at 112, 120 (R-J. Dupuy ed. 1979), Hague Academy of Int'l Law.
43 Comment, Waller, Warnock and Roe v. Wade: Variations on the Status of the
Orphan Embryo, 2 .J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 231, 253 (1986).
44 See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
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the full force of law by the members of the European Community remains to
be seen.
Under U.S. law, a woman's right to the new reproductive biology may be
grounded in the penumbra creating the right to privacy.4 5 However, the search
for such a right challenges some values upon which other rights have been
extended, for example, the cohesiveness of the nuclear family. 46
If international law is to provide a human right to all reproductive alterna-
tives, not only would municipal laws and customs provide source material, dec-
larations of international organizations would as well. For example, the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights, 47 states specifically in chapter II, article 4,
paragraph 1, that:
Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be
protected by land and, in general, from the moment of conception. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.48
45 See Kritchevsky, supra note 41, at 27-28. See also, Carey v. Population Services
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46 It has been asserted that the right to reproductive technology extends to all
women whether married or single. Some have argued against such use pointing out that
the cohesiveness of the nuclear family would be jeopardized if not totally ruined. Smith
& Iraola, supra note 41, at 281-89; Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,
Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
MICH. L..REv. 463, 541 (1983).
Since 1888, the Supreme Court has recognized the traditional marriage and the re-
sulting family unit as the bulwark of society. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211
(1888). The Court has sought to protect the institution of marriage, Zablocki v. Hill,
434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978), and to underscore traditional child bearing as the central
focus of every family. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S 390 (1923).
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the depth of these two opposing
positions. Suffice it to note that the protection and regulation of marriage as a social
institution arguably allows the states considerable latitude in regulating forms of bio-
logical or assisted reproduction and enables them to draw legal distinctions between
married and unmarried persons. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977). In
drawing lines between the rights of these two groups, it has been recognized that such a
classification cannot be made with mathematical precision and invariably "results in
some inequality." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S 61, 78 (1911)).
47 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, Treaty Series No. 36,
OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. A/16 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter Ameri-
can Convention]. See A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD, ch. 4 (2d ed.
1982).
48 American Convention, supra note 47, art. 4.
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The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms4" states in section I, article 2, paragraph 1 that "Everyone's
right to life shall be protected by law."'50 Article 8, paragraph 1 states, "Ev-
eryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence." 5' Finally, article 12 states, "Men and women of marrigeable
age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national
laws governing the exercise of this right.
52
The United Nations in particular serves to develop consensus on human
rights issues. Respecting and observing human rights as a fundamental free-
dom is a major goal of the United Nations set out in the U.N. Charter.53 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 54 adopted in 1948, was viewed as but
a "standard of achievement" and not an instrument with legal enforcement
provisions. 55 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights56 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 57 (to-
gether with its Optional Protocol) 58 that became effective in 1976, comple-
ment, enhance and strengthen the Declaration so that when taken as a unit of
the three instruments have been termed an International Bill of Human
Rights.5 9
The consensus of nations is essential for U.N. declarations to achieve the
status of international law, customary or general. While the United States is a
party to the U.N. Charter, it has signed, but not ratified, the International
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. It has not signed the Optional Protocol to the International Conven-
tion on Civil and Political Rights.
Interestingly, a recently compiled list of forty-two principal international
human rights treaties60 indicates that the United States is a party to thirteen
49 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 2313 U.N.T.S. 222 [here-
inafter Eurpoean Convention]. See generally L. MIKAELSEN, EUROPEAN PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1980).
11 European Convention, supra note 49, art. 2.
"I Id. art. 8.
52 Id. art. 12.
53 U.N. CHARTER, art. 55. See MacDonald, The United Nations and the Promotion
of Human Rights in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 203
(R. MacDonald, D. Johnston & G. Morris eds. 1978).
5" G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
55 See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 180 (1980); L. MIKAELSEN, supra note 49, at 7-9 (1980).
56 G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
5 G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.S. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966)
58 Id. See MIKAELSEN, supra note 49, at 9-10.
51 McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 55, at 180.
60 See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (R. Lillich ed. 1986).
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treaties and agreements pertinent to international human rights . 6 On Novem-
ber 4, 1988, President Reagan signed legislation implementing the Interna-
tional Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. 2 Ten trea-
ties and agreements have been signed by the United States, but not ratified.63
Twenty-two treaties and agreements remain unsigned by the United States.6 4
61 As of 1986, the United States was a party to the following human rights treaties:
United Nations Charter; Slavery Convention; Protocol Amending the Slavery Conven-
tion; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Insti-
tutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; Inter-American Convention on the Granting
of Political Rights to Women; Convention on the Political Rights of Women; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees; Protocol of
Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States. See id. at vii, viii.
62 The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606, 102
Stat. 3045, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1988).
63 Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor; Convention on the Con-
sent of Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages; Interna-
tional Convention on th Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic and
Cultural Rights; American Convention on Human Rights; Protocal I Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts; Protocal II Addition to the Geneva Conventions of Au-
gust 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflict; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women and The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. See supra note 60 at viii-ix.
64 Inter-American Convention on the Granting Rights to Women; Convention Con-
cerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize; Convention
Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain
Collectively; Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Ex-
ploitation of the Prostitution of Others; Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration
for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value; Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees; Convention on the International Right of Correction; Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons; Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women; Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occu-
pation; Convention Against Discrimination in Education; Convention Concerning
Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-nationals in Social Security; Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness; Convention Concerning Employment Policy; Op-
tional Protocol to the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights; Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity; Convention Concerning Protection and Facilities to be Afforded Workers'
Representatives in the Undertaking; Convention Concerning Basic Arms and Stan-
dards of Social Policy; Convnetion Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour; Interna-
tional Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid; In-
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It could therefore be said that consensus has not yet fully emerged on the
definitional boundries of human rights. However, it has also been said that "in
1789 there was no concept of international human rights"6 5 insofar as the
framers of the Constitution did not explicitly disclose its existence. Nonethe-
less, a recent study has found the early history of the United States recognized
the essential principle of human rights under the term or concept of "the
rights of man," 6 Indeed, the actual use of these precepts has been suggested
"with the most major politico-legal developments in the United States over the
last two-and-one-half centuries. ' 67
Human rights, as a concept, has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme
Court since the 1790's. The phrase "human rights" appears in seventy-five of
the Court's decisions through 1989-sixty-nine within the last fifty years
alone.68 Among other freedoms, human rights have been associated with "the
right to marry,"6' 9 "the right to procreate,"70 the right "to conceive and raise
one's children,"7 1 and "the right to have offspring."7 2 The constitutional treat-
ment of noncoital reproduction has important consequences not only for U.S.
domestic law, discussed at Section V below, but also for the revelation of
norms of international law.
Whether or not international law currently recognizes an individual's right
to the new reproductive biology, the right to procreate through artificial meth-
ods for all citizens, regardless of marital status and ability to pay, has yet to
be determined by national courts and legislatures as a basic right. Recognition
of such a right would involve astronomical expense for the state and open up a
Pandora's box of other citizen wishes for the state to act upon.
IV. NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON ASSISTED NON-COITAL REPRODUCTION
A. The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe Assembly's Recommendation of 1986 on the Use of
Human Embryos and Foetuses for Diagnostic, Therapeutic, Scientific, Indus-
trial and Commercial Purposes acknowledged, "that from the moment of fer-
ternational Convention against Apartheid Sports; Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture. See supra note 60 at ix-xi.
63 Tel Oren v. Lybian Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
66 See Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S History
and The Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543
(1989).
67 Id. at 650.
68 Id. at 545.
69 See e.g., City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 463
(1985); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
70 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
71 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771 (1975) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska); Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 at 651 (1972) (also referring to Meyer).
72 Skinner,.316 U.S. at 536, 541.
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tilization of the ovule, human life develops in a continuous pattern, and that it
is not possible to make a clear-cut distinction during the first phases (embry-
onic) of its development .... ,,73 The Recommendation called upon the govern-
ments of the Member States to limit the use of human embryos to strictly
therapeutic purposes, forbid the creation of human viable embryos by IVF for
research purposes, and prohibit the maintenance of embryos in vitro beyond
the fourteenth day after fertilization.74 Subsequently, the Council instructed
its competent committees to undertake a report regarding "the use of human
embryos and foetuses in scientific research," and to be mindful of "the neces-
sary balance between the principles of freedom of research and of respect for
human life and other aspects of human rights." 75 Accordingly, the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Citizen's Rights submitted its report calling for a ban on
the creation of excess embryos through IVF procedures."
On March 16, 1989, the European Parliament recognized the need "to pro-
tect human life from the moment of fertilization,"' 7 but also noted "the
mother's right to self-determination.1 78 The Parliament further resolved that:
1.) the number of egg cells fertilized by in vitro fertilization to be lim-
ited to the number that can actually be implanted;
79
2.) a prohibition [be placed] on any form of genetic experimentations on
embryos outside the womb;80
3.) the storage of frozen embryos should be permitted only if the wo-
man's state of health temporarily prevents her from having the em-
bryo implanted and she has stated that she is willing to have it im-
planted at a later date. Under no circumstances should a frozen
embryo be stored for more than three years. If implantation is out of
the question (because of refusal, illness or the death of the woman)
the embryos should be taken out of storage and allowed to die. Trad-
ing in or experimentation with such embryos should be punishable
by law.81
73 D. GIESEN, INTERNATIONAL MALPRACTICE LAW (Recommendation No. 1046)
750, 753, 754 (1988).
74 See id.
7 Id. at 555.
76 EUR. PARL. SESS. Doc. No. A 2-0372/88 (1989). In May 1984, the French Na-
tional Ethics Committee considered the use of "tissues from embryos or from dead
human fetuses for therapeutic, diagnostic, or scientific ends," with transplantation of
fetal tissue into patients being advocated only when no other effective alternative ex-
isted. Walters, Ethics Issues in Fetal Research: A Look Back and a Look Forward, 36
CLINICAL RESEARCH 209, 211 n.5 (1988).
77 J.O. Comm. Eur. (No. C96) 171, 172 (1989).
78 Id. at 172.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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4.) that heterologous in vivo or in vitro insemination is not desirable;
this applies to the donation of sperm or egg and frozen storage
thereof. .. '
Regardless of whether this resolution safeguards the rights of the unborn or
restricts the growth of embryological science, it has no binding enforcement
mechanisms for the Member States of the European Community.
B. Federal Republic of Germany
The German Legal Profession's Congress on Artificial Reproductive Tech-
niques meeting in Berlin in 1986 resolved that: "Human life begins with the
unification of egg and sperm touching off a period of continuous development
without qualitatively differentiated stages."83 Furthermore, the Congress of-
fered its interpretation of the German Constitution that the embryo enjoys full
legal protection regardless of whether being created in vivo or in vitro.8 ' The
Bundestag declared that the sole aim of creating embryos should be for im-
plantation-and not research. Accordingly, only eggs which are to be used for
implantation should be fertlized.8 5 In circumstances where the cryopreserva-
tion of embryos was undertaken, such actions could be justified only "to avoid
their destruction and with a view toward implantation within a certain time
limit."8 If, for any reason implantation of an embryo cannot be achieved, "the
embryo is to be left to fate."87
In the summer of 1989, the Federal Republic of Germany announced a new
legislative agenda regarding embryonic research that would largely prohibit
the use of human embryos in biomedical research and impose criminal penal-
ties for violations including imprisonment up to five years. Under this proposed
law, only research not harming the embryo will be permitted.88
C. Australia
Australia's legislative efforts regarding the new reproductive biology were
initially undertaken in response to the Rios case. On May 20, 1981, a married
couple from Los Angeles, Mario and Elsa Rios, were allowed to participate in
82 J.0. Comm. Eur. (No. C96) 173 (1989).
83 D. GIESEN, supra note 73, at 753.
84 Id.
85 Id.
88 Id.
87 Id. See Sass, Moral Dilemmas in Perinatal Medicine and The Quest for Large
Scale Embryo Research: A Discussion of Recent Guidelines in the Federal Republic
of Germany, 12 J. MED. & PHIL. 279 (1987).
88 Kirk, Germany to Ban Embryo Use, 245 SCIEN cE 464 (1989). See generally
Gregoratos, Tempest in the Laboratory: Medical Research in Spare Embryos from In
Vitro Fertilization, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 977 (1986).
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a clinical IVF program in Melbourne, Australia."9 Because of his infertility,
Mr. Rios consented to the participation of an anonymous donor from Mel-
bourne. Three eggs provided by his wife were successfully artificially insemi-
nated. One embryo was implanted in Mrs. Rios on June 8, 1981, and the other
two frozen for subsequent use. The implantation resulted in a miscarriage and
the resulting trauma left Mrs. Rios emotionally unfit to participate in another
attempt at impregnation. She and her husband died in a plane crash in Chile
before another attempt at implantation could be madef 0 Because Mr. and
Mrs. Rios had not executed a will, the California laws of intestate succession
allowed Mr. Rios' son by a previous marriage a right to his father's share of
the estate and the mother of Mrs. Rios was entitled to take her daughter's
share.91
The Victoria state legislature ordered that the remaining Rios' embryos be
preserved in their liquid nitrogen container.92 As of September 14, 1989, the
embryos remained in cryopreservation awaiting the appearance of a volunteer
surrogate mother for their thawing and implantation."
In early 1982, the State of Victoria responded to the Rios case by establish-
ing a committee, headed by Professor Louis Waller, to investigate the
problems arising from IVF and donor gametes. Soon after the States of
Queensland and Western Australia organized similar governmental inquiries.9
The Waller Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro
Fertilization was released in August 1984 by the Attorney General of the
State of Victoria. The Committee recommended that the disposition of stored
embryos should not be determined by the hospital where they are stored;95
that such embryos do not possess inheritance rights but do possess some legal
rights;" and "[i]n cases where by mischance or for any other reason, an em-
bryo is stored which cannot be transferred as planned, and no agreed provision
89 See Lawson, Molloy, Jobson & Walley, The Life and Strange Times of Elsa
Rios, Austl. Bull., July 3, 1984, at 25 [hereinafter Elsa Rios].
90 Id. at 23.
91 See Cal. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 6401-02 (West Supp. 1989). See also Wallis,
Quickening Debate Over Life in Ice, TIME, July 2, 1984, at 46 (discussing the legal and
ethical dilemmas surrounding the concept of "embryo rights").
92 L.A. Times, Mar. 14, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (discussing the lack of law relating to
embryo rights, and various attempts to establish legal and ethical guidelines in relation
thereto).
93 See Letter from Louis Waller, Chairman of The Law Reform Commission of
Victoria, to Prof. George Smith (Sept. 14, 1989) (on file at the offices of the Boston
University International Law Journal).
"I Scott, Legal Implications and Law Making in Bioethics and Experimental
Medicine, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 47, 55-60 (1985). See also Elsa Rios
supra note 89, at 22, 25.
on THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ARISING
FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED
BY IN VITRO FERTILIZATION § 2.16 (1984) [hereinafter WALLER REPORT].
96 Id. § 2.19.
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has been made at the time of storage ... the embryos shall be removed from
storage."97 The Committee also suggested that the government allow embryos
to be frozen98 for experimental research provided that it was "immediate and
in an approved and current project in which the embryo shall not be allowed
to develop beyond the state of implantation, which is completed 14 days after
fertilization." 9 Some of the recommendations of the Committee will be incor-
porated in the Victoria's legislative proposals for subsequent parliamentary
consideration, while others will be open to further debate and study. 100
In 1982, the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia
developed national ethical guidelines for IVF procedures.101 Guideline Seven
suggests an upper time limit of ten years for storing embryos provided that the
storage would not be extended beyond "the time of conventional reproductive
need or competence of the female donor." 10 2 Thus, at least at a woman's death
the embryos left in cryopreservation could be destroyed. The Council endorsed
several scientific procedures to correct infertility among married couples in-
cluding IVF,103 the use of donor eggs to produce embryos,1 04 and the use of
artificial insemination by anonymous male donors1105
With the passage of the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act in 1984, the
Victorian Parliament became the world's first legislative body to enact regula-
tions governing IVF and embryo experimentation.106 The Infertility Act was
not, however, fully "proclaimed" as effective legislation until July 1, 1988.107
The Infertility Act neglects to define such critical words as "embryo" and
"fertilization" and omits a declaration of when a genetically unique human
individual comes into existence.20 8 Thus it still remains an open question as to
precisely when life begins. Nevertheless, the law provides for imprisonment of
individuals who fertilize a woman's eggs removed from her body for purposes
-7 Id. § 2.18.
98 Id. §§ 3.25-3.28.
99 Id. § 3.29.
100 See Sydney Morning Herald, Sept. 4, at 3, col. 2 (discussing the State of Victo-
ria's ban on payments to surrogate mothers).
101 See NATIONAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE NH
& MRC COMMITTEE ON ETHIcs IN MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING THE HUMAN FE-
TUS AND HUMAN FETAL TISSUE (1983).
102 Id. at 36.
103 See id. at 35.
10, Id. at 35-36.
105 Id. at 35.
108 See Buckle, Dawson & Singer, The Syngamy Debate: When Precisely Does a
Human Life Begin?, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 174 (1989); Kuhse, A Report from
Australia: When a Human Life Has Not Yet Begun-According to The Law, 2
BIOETHICS 334 (1988).
107 Khuse, supra note 106, at 334.
1o Buckle, Dawson & Singer, supra note 106, at 174.
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other than those associated with an implantation of the resulting embryo in a
specific woman's uterus. 09
The law seeks to clearly distinguish between using excess embryos and cre-
ating embryos for research purposes."' While producing embryos for research
purposes is prohibited, an eight member Standing Review and Advisory Com-
mittee on Infertility has been empaneled to evaluate proposals made for subse-
quent research on excess embryos."' Currently, the law severely restricts re-
search into the problems of infertility." 2
Drawing a distinction between research undertaken on embryos created for
the express purpose of research study and research on "excess" embryos pro-
duces an odd result."13 The law prohibits medical researchers to test the safety
of reproductive techniques before application in a clinical setting.'14 However,
researchers can proceed with new and untested reproductive procedures that
could well lead to the birth of abnormal children ."5
Anomalously, the law allows experimentation on excess embryos to the four-
teenth day of their creation." 6 Accordingly, "if the point at which a human
life begins were relevant to the permissibility of destroying it, this would mean
that a human life does not begin until day 14. Why, then, the requirement to
halt experimentation on specially created embryos before syngamy occurs?"1 7
For the scientist, fertilization is a complex process lasting for some twenty-
four hours-beginning with the incorporation of the sperm into the egg.",8 The
process continues with the egg completing maturation and the genetic material
of each condensing into chromosomes. The male and female contributions then
come together to form a new genotype:
This new formation of the new genotype is syngamy; and, because the
union of the two gametes does not seem to be complete before syngamy
has occured, the proper scientific use of the term "fertilization" includes
the entire process which begins with the sperm passing through the zona
pellucida and comes to completion at syngamy."19
109 Khuse, supra note 106, at 334.
110 Id. An excess embryo is defined as one that "has been created with the intention
of implanting it, but which has subsequently become surplus" possibly because "more
eggs were successfully fertilized than could be implanted." Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 335.
113 See id. at 336. This distinction was considered irrelevant by the British Warnock
Committee.
114 Kuhse, supra note 106, at 336.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 341.
117 Id.
118 Buckle, Dawson & Singer, supra note 106, at 179.
119 Id. at 175.
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The argument for and against syngamy as an indication of when life begins
will continue.1 2 The significance of this argument is to be found in appreciat-
ing the difficulty in discovering a clear or "marker event" in a seemingly con-
tinuous biological process.
121
Those who champion the inviolability of human life from the moment of
fertilization have often said that this is the only clear and non-arbitrary
dividing line-from that moment on, the human individual exists and
grows in a gradual manner from embryo to adult. The electron-micro-
scope has shown that fertilization itself is not an event, but a process, and
it is not clear that there is a non-arbitrary way of saying at just what
point in this (or any of the subsequent development processes) a human
individual begins to exist.
122
Regardless of how the debate is resolved, the Victoria law will still provide
different treatment regarding research on embryos depending upon the intent
underlying their creation. The problem for all future legislative schemes is the
very validity of their design and implementation and, whether, once in place,
they should remain as "bright lines" or serve as fluid and flexible "guidelines"
for decision making. If some type of legislative direction is not taken, however,
the courts will necessarily fill the vacuum as the ultimate decisionmakers.
D. Great Britain
In 1982, four years after the birth of Louise Brown, the world's first test-
tube baby, 2' the British government constituted a Committee of Inquiry into
Human Fertilization and Embryology. The Committee, chaired by Dame
Mary Warnock, was directed to examine the social, ethical, and legal implica-
tions of the new reproductive biology. The Committee submitted its report in
July 1984, and great debate and discussion-has followed." 4
In essence, the Warnock Committee approved the cryopreservation of em-
bryos but only under strict constraints and subject to review by a statutory
licensing authority." 5 The Committee recognized that even though embryos
enjoyed an ethical or moral ("special") status, embryonic research could con-
tinue, subject to careful monitoring, for a fourteen day period after fertiliza-
tion. 26 Moreover, excess embryos could be proper subjects for research within
this time period if informed consent to such actions is obtained from the
120 See id. at 176.
121 Kuhse, supra note 106, at 342.
122 Id.
I" See generally Steptoe & Edwards, Birth after the Re-Implantations of a Human
Embryo, LANCET 366 (1978).
12 Priest, The Report of the Warnock Committee on the Human Fertilization and
Embryology, 48 MOD. L. REv. 73 (1985). See also Glazebrook, Human Beginnings, 43
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 209 (1984).
125 Priest, supra note 124, at 75-78. See also The Warnock Committee, 289 BRIT.
MED. J. 238 (1984).
126 See Priest, supra note 124, at 77.
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couple generating the embryo. 127 The Committee also recommended that legis-
lation be enacted to allow research on any embryonic life derived from IVF
whether or not the embryo was intentionally developed for research.' 28 The
report does not detail the extent to which experiments on embryos may be
undertaken. If they involve inserting sharp instruments into the embryo, itself,
stronger opposition would obviously be voiced than if mere microscopic obser-
vation of embryonic development were charted." 9 The Committee suggested
that ten years be the maximum allowable time for storage (with the right of
disposal passing to the storage authority after that time period). 30
Regarding rights of inheritance, the Committee proposed legislation to elim-
inate the dilemma of Australia's "orphan" embryos. The proposed legislation
provides that any child born of an IVF procedure that had used an embryo
either frozen or stored, "who was not in utero at the death of the father shall
be disregarded for the purposes of succession to the inheritance from the lat-
ter." 3' Concerning the use of surrogate mothers, the Committee proposed leg-
islation that would impose a criminal sanction for the maintenance of surro-
gate mother agencies, but the Committee simultaneously suggested that those
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See Lee, Re-Reading Warnock in RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN MEDICINE at 37-52,
43 (P. Byrne ed. 1986). See Goodhart, Embryo Experiments, 297 BRIT. MED. J.
(1988). The British Medical Association supports the following recommendations:
1. Tissue may be obtained only from dead fetuses resulting from therapeutic or
spontaneous abortion. Death of the fetus is defined as an irreversible loss of func-
tion of the organism as a whole.
2. UK laws on transplantation must be followed. The woman from whom the
fetal material is obtained must consent to the use of the fetal material for research
and/or therapeutic purposes.
3. Transplantation activity must not interfere with the method of performing
abortions, nor the timing of abortions, nor influence the routine abortion procedure
of the hospital in any way. Abortion must be performed subject to the Abortion
Act, and any subsequent amendments thereof, uninfluenced by the fate of the fetal
tissue. The anonymity of the donor should be maintained.
4. The generation or termination of a pregnancy solely to produce suitable ma-
terial is unethical. There should be no link between the donor and the recipient.
5. There must be no financial reward for the donation of fetal material or a
fetus.
6. Nervous tissue may be used only as isolated neurones or tissue fragments for
transplantation. Other fetal organs nay be used as either complete or partial or-
gans for transplantation.
7. All hospital staff directly involved in the procedures-including the abor-
tion-must be informed about the procedures involved.
8. Every project involving transplantation of fetal tissue must be approved by
the local ethical research committee.
BMA Guidelines on The Use of Fetal Tissue, THE LANCET, May 14, 1988, at 1119.
130 Priest, supra note 124.
231 Id.
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individuals entering into private surrogation arrangements, in connection with
IVF and embryo transfer procedures be exempted from criminal
prosecution.13 2
The Embryo Bill pending in the British House of Lords is expected to tackle
the issue of whether or not scientific research may be conducted on embryos.
Notably, the bill would give fathers a right to veto decisions made by the
mothers regarding the disposition of frozen embryos which they had fertil-
ized."' 3 Lord Trafford, a physician and a health minister, who introduced the
Embryo Bill, had originally hoped to separate the issues of abortion and the
status of embryos. However, opponents of abortion could argue that if a man
has veto powers over the use of embryos which he has fertilized, arguably, he
should be allowed to exercise the same right to prevent his wife or companion
from having an abortion. One parliamentarian opined that, "Every pro-life
group will ask why should the father have rights over a 14-day embryo, but
not a 14-week-old foetus."' 34
It remains to be seen whether this initial legislative foray into supplement-
ing the initial Warnock recommendations will provide the much needed frame-
work for legal-medical-social decision making in this field or be merely an
additional obfuscation.135
V. REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The extent to which U.S. states may validly regulate IVF procedures and
embryo transfers depends upon whether these acts are viewed as fundamental
rights. Thus, the threshhold question is whether they are "rights" guaranteed
by the Constitution as part of the "right to marital privacy.' 36
Various Supreme Court decisions seem to grant "the right . 'to marry,
establish a home and bring up children'" as among those liberties granted by
132 Id.
133 In September 1989, the Embryo Bill was proposed to allow "[e]stranged hus-
bands or unmarried fathers ... a veto over what happens to the frozen embryos they
have fertilized . . . ." The Times (London), Sept. 4, 1989, at 3, col. 1. The debate over
the bill was heated and emotional, but despite strong opposition, the House of Lords in
February 1990, defeated attempts to stop IVF research. The Times (London), Feb. 9,
1990, at 9, col. 1. On April 24, 1990, the BBC reported that the British Parliment
voted to allow IVF research on embryos up to 14-days-old. BBC News About Britain,
Apr. 24, 1990 [on file at the offices of the Boston University International Law
Journal].
134 The Times (London), Sept. 4, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
135 See Priest, Assisted Reproduction-Developments in England, 37 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 535, 550 (1988).
"I6 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 740 (2d ed.
1983). See also, Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for
Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 983 (1982).
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the fourteenth amendment."3 7 Based upon these cases, it could be argued that
any state regulation on IVF and embryo transfers would be an intrusion upon
the fundamental right to marital privacy. 138 "[I]f the decision to beget a child
is a protected area of privacy, presumably the actual method of begetting also
would be protected. Thus, any statute affecting this delicate area would have
to serve a compelling state interest and must do so by the least restrictive
means."
1 39
A more conservative analysis of the Supreme Court decisions in this area
recognizes, at the threshold, that the right to privacy is not explicitly men-
tioned in the United States Constitution. No right of sexual freedom is found
within the gambit of procreative rights recognized by the Supreme Court nor
has the Court fashioned a general right of personal privacy which is suffi-
ciently broad-based to encompass sex outside marriage.1 40
A. Legislative Positions Among the States
It is doubtful that Congress could ever enact effective legislation on the le-
gal status of an embryo because society is not of a singular mind. Nor is there
a consensus as to when "life" should be legally proctected. Judicial interpreta-
tion of this issue has aroused national debate with the decision in Roe v.
Wade.141 Despite the lack of agreement regarding when life begins, those chil-
dren born of an IVF procedure using either a donor ova or donor sperm should
be recognized as children of the family in which they were born. No issue of
illegitimacy should be raised nor should the donors be held to any level of
financial support of the child. Similarly, the child should have no right of in-
heritance against the donors. The best interests of the IVF child are served,
and, more importantly, the strength of the family unit is enhanced and its
stability assured.' 42
137 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)(citation ommitted). See also Ca-
rey v. Population Services Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
131 Lorio, supra note 136, at 1007-8.
139 Id.
140 Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Pri-
vacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 538
(1983).
'l Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
142 See generally, Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and
The Law, 57 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1968).
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After Roe, some twenty-five states enacted fetal research laws 4 designed
primarily to control research on aborted fetuses.1 " Several statutes extend
their protective coverage to research on embryos . 45 If cumbersome safeguards
143 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-434, 82-435
(1976); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
390.001 (6) (West 1936); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, (PP) 81-32 to 81-32.1 (Smith-Hurd
1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (West 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.026 (Bald-
win 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1593 (West Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 112 § 612J (West 1983); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333-2685 (West 1989);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.421-145.422 (West 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037
(Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-108(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1989); NEB REV.
STAT. § 28-342 to 28-346 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1 to 24-9A-7 (West
Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.2-01 to -02 (1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2919.14 (Page 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1989); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-54-i to 11-54-2 (West Supp.
1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. [[39-4-208
(1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1988).
144 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-434 to 82-435
(1976); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
390.001 (6) (West 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 (PP) 81-32 to 81-32.1 (Smith-Hurd
1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (West 1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.026
(Baldwin 1985); NEB REV. STAT. §§ 28-342 to 28-346 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.14 (Page 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1989); 18 Pa. Const.
Stat. Ann. § 3216 (Purdon 1983); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-4-208 (1988); Wyo. Stat. §
35-6-115 (1988).
See Vetri, Reproductive Technologies and United States Law, 37 INT'L COMP. L.Q.
505, 520 (1988).
145 Examples are the California and Minnesota statutes. The California statute
provides:
(a) It is unlawful for any person to use any aborted product of human conception,
other than fetal remains, for any type of scientific or laboratory research or for
any other kind of experimentation or study, except to protect or preserve the life
and health of the fetus. "Fetal remains," as used in this section, means a lifeless
product of conception regardless of the duration of pregnancy. A fetus shall not be
deemed to be lifeless for the purposes of this section, unless there is an absence of
a discernible heartbeat.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956(a) (West. 1984).
The Minnesota statute provides:
1. Whoever uses or permits the use of a living human conceptus for any type of
scientific, laboratory research or other experimentation except to protect the life or
health of the conceptus, or except as herein provided, shall be guilty of a gross
misdemeanor.
2. The use of a living human conceptus for research or experimentation which
verifiable scientific evidence has shown to be harmless to the conceptus shall be
permitted.
3. Whoever buys or sells a living human conceptus or nonrenewable organ of
the body is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Nothing in this subdivision prohibits
(1) the buying and selling of a cell culture line or lines taken from a nonliving
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effecting excess embryo preservation are required, the initiation of medical-
scientific programs utilizing IVF procedures could be discouraged. 146 More-
over, in a number of these states, the very legality of IVF as a medical proce-
dure to overcome infertility is in question.1 47
Only Pennsylvania1 48 and Louisiana 49 have statutes regarding IVF. Penn-
sylvania's law simply monitors IVF by requiring anyone conducting the proce-
human conceptus; (2) payments for reasonable expenses associated with the re-
moval, storage, and transportation of a human organ, including payments made to
or on behalf of a living organ donor for actual expenses such as medical costs, lost
income, or travel expenses that are incurred as a direct result of a donation of the
nonrenewable organ; or (3) Financial assistance payments provided under insur-
ance and medicare reimbursement programs.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West Supp. 1985).
146 Michigan statutes, for example, prohibit research on a live embryo if its life or
health may be jeopardized. Thus, § 333-2685 provides that:
(1) A person shall not use a live embryo, fetus, or neonate for nontherapeutic
research if, in the best judgment of the person conducting the research, based
upon the available knowledge or information at the approximate time of the re-
search, the research substantially jeopardizes the life or health of the embryo, fe-
tus, or neonate. Nontherapeutic research shall not in any case be performed on an
embryo or fetus known by the person conducting the research to be the subject of
a planned abortion being performed for any purpose other than to protect the life
of the mother.
(2) For purposes of subsection (1) the embryo or fetus shall be conclusively
presumed not to be the subject of a planned abortion if the nother signed a written
statement at the time of research, that she was not planning an abortion (MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685) (West 1989) § 333.2686. Sections 2685 to 2691
shall not prohibit or regulate diagnostic, assessment, or treatment procedures, the
purpose of which is to determine the life or status or improve the health of the
embryo, fetus, or neonate involved or the mother involved. § 14.15 (2692) Sec.
2692. As used in sections 2685 to 2691, "nontherapeutic research" means scien-
tific or laboratory research, or other kind of experimentation or investigation not
designed to improve the health of the research subject.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333-2685.
147 Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies,
70 A.B.A. J. 50, 54-55 (1984). Blumberg, Legal Issues on Nonsurgical Human Ovum
Transfer, 251 J.A.M.A. 1178 (March 2, 1984); Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett &
Braverman, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo.
L.J. 1295 (1979).
148 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (Purdon 1983).
149 LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 129, 130 (West 1990). The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986), examined
the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that provided, "no person shall experiment
on an unborn child or a child born as the result of an abortion, whether the unborn
child or child is alive or dead, unless the experimentation is therapeutic to the unborn
child or child." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.35.13. The court held the statute un-
constitutionally vague, because the distinction between experimentation and testing, or
between research and practice, is virtually meaningless. Id. at 999.
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dure to file quarterly reports with the state Department of Health fully
describing the processes involved. 150 In 1986, the Louisiana legislature decreed
that, "[a] viable in vitro fertilized ovum is a juridicial person" that cannot be
destroyed'"' and furthermore-that such an ovum "cannot be owned by the in
vitro fertilization patients who owe it a high duty of care and prudent adminis-
tration."' 5 2 If a renunciation of parental rights by the IVF patients occurs, the
"ovum shall be available for adoptive implantation. .... 11,5 Sadly, no other
state statutes clarify the legal status of IVF children.15"
Illinois had a statute which prohibited selling or experimenting upon a "fe-
tus produced by the fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm unless
such experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus thereby produced."' 5 5 How-
ever, the statute was recently struck down as unconstitutionally vague and re-
strictive of women's fundamental right to privacy. 56
B. U.S. Government's Position
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HSS) has the re-
sponsibility for regulating human subjects involved in research conducted or
funded by HSS or other federal agencies, including research and development
relating to IVF. 57 The HSS Ethics Advisory Board reviews every proposal
concerning research projects involving fetuses or pregnant women. The Board
examines the research projects' "acceptability from an ethical standpoint." 15 8
HSS regulations specifically protect fetuses that are the subject of proposed
experimentation and IVF research. 59
15 See 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3212(e) (Purdon 1983).
151 See LA. REv. STAT. Civil Code, § 129 (1986).
152 See id. § 130.
153 Id.
154 See Andrews, supra note 147.
155 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd 1989).
158 See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F.Supp 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
The only other decision involving an in-vitro fertilization procedure was an unpub-
lished case, Del Zio v. Manhattan's Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, No. 74-
3588 (S.D.N.Y., filed April 12, 1978), which resulted in an award of $50,000 damages
to the prospective parents for emotional distress caused by the willful destruction of an
embryo produced by IVF. The Chief of Obstetrics and Gynecology had removed the
embryo and destroyed it, stating that the physician who had performed the laparoscopy
and subsequent fertilization in 1972 lacked the necessary skills, and moreover, the hos-
pital's committee on experimentation had not yet approved IVF. See Lorio,, In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 996-
97 (1982).
157 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-124, 46.301 (1989).
Id. § 46.204(d) (1989). See also id. § 46.205 (1989).
I5- d. §§ 46.101-.211 (1985). In vitro fertilization is defined as "any fertilization of
human ova which occurs outside the body of a female, either through admixture of
donor human sperm and ova or by another means." Id. § 46.203(g) (1989).
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Although limited to research efforts funded in whole or in part by the fed-
eral government,' 6 0 these guidelines make a significant distinction with regard
to potential legal rights of unimplanted embryos.' The distinction is apparent
in the definition of "fetus"-"the product of conception from the time of im-
plantation (as evidenced by any of the presumptive signs of pregnancy, such as
missed menses, or a medically acceptable pregnancy test). .. .
As a consequence of this structured definition, research undertaken on fe-
tuses in utero and ex utero is prohibited unless the purpose of the activity is
either to meet the particular health needs of an at-risk fetus or to obtain bi-
omedical knowledge not otherwise obtainable, but then only if the harm posed
to the fetus is minimal.6 3 Research undertaken on non-viable fetuses ex utero
is prohibited unless vital functions are not maintained artificially, experimental
activities that would terminate vital functions are not used, or the research
purpose is to obtain otherwise unobtainable significant biomedical knowl-
edge.6 4 The effect of these restrictions on embryonic and fetal research is that
the scientific pursuit of knowledge is significantly handicapped. Because of this
de facto moratorium, no federally funded research on IVF has been under-
taken since 1975.165 Private research into the mysteries and the opportunities
of the new reproductive biology continues. 166 But without a balanced regula-
tory scheme and sources for federal research funding, the initiative and the
momentum for scientific advancement is curtailed.
Both as a response to Louise Brown's extracorporeal birth in 1978 and to a
grant application for IVF research, HSS and its Ethics Advisory Board de-
cided to study the complex ethical, legal, social and scientific issues raised by
IVF and embryo transfer. 6 7 Their report concluded that federal support of
research on human IVF, in order to establish both the safety and the effective-
ness of IVF procedures, would be ethically permissible so long as certain con-
ditions were met.'68 The report was ultimately "buried in the bureaucracy. "169
160 Id. § 46.101(a) (1989).
161 Blumberg, supra note 147.
162 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(c) (1989).
161 Id. §§ 46.208(a)(1)-(2) (1989).
164 Id. §§ 46.209(b)(1)-(3) (1989).
165 See also Abramowitz, A Stalemate on Test-Tube Baby Research, 14 HASTINGS
CENTER REPT. 5 (1984).
"I The Bush Administration recently extended the prohibition on federal scientists
conducting research using fetal transplants, thus effectively continuing the federal gov-
ernment's prohibition of scientific inquiry into and study of the new reproductive biol-
ogy. See infra note 172.
167 Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Report and Conclusions: H.E.W. Support of Research Involving Human In Vitro Fer-
tilization and Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033 (1979).
168 See id. at 35,057. Among these conditions were that the in vitro embryo (blasto-
cyst) be sustained no longer than the implantation stage and that IVF be used only by
married couples who had donated their sperm and ova. See also Abramowitz, supra
note 165, at 5.
1990]
46 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Yet, due largely to the leadership of then-Congressman Albert Gore of Ten-
nessee, hearings were conducted in August, 1984, on the very issue of embryo
transfers and the legal, ethical and medical responses to such procedures. 17
Although no firm or conclusive steps were taken as a result of these hearings,
the hearings served to focus attention on the need for continuing dialogue in
this area.
Given the oftentimes strident anti-abortion mood of a vocal segment of soci-
ety, strong positive movement will probably not occur at the federal regulatory
level.17 1 Indeed, on November 2, 1989, the Bush Administration extended the
prohibition on support for research involving fetal tissue transplants from in-
duced abortions.1 7 2 The principal reason for such action was that the positive
health benefits generated by this research were outweighed by the accompany-
ing complex moral and ethichal problems.' 73 Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary
of HSS, stated that permitting human fetal research "will increase the inci-
dence of abortion across the country."'1 4 What is once again evident is the
inextricable relationship between abortion and fetal research and experimenta-
tion and, even more importantly, the almost inextricable relationship between
politics and morality.
C. The Impact and the Promise of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
In tackling "the most politically divisive domestic legal issue of our time,' 7 5
the Supreme Court, on July 3, 1989, upheld the validity of a Missouri statute
which significantly restricts a woman's right to obtain an abortion.176 The pre-
"' Krause, Artificial Conception: Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q. 185, 190
(1985).
170 See Hearings on Human Embryo Transfer, Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 142
(1984).
171 This pessimistic, although realistic, view is tied to a perception that it would be
far better to hold in abeyance any strong movement at this time for fear of its possible
linkage with the right-to-life controversies and would thus give rise to the real possibil-
ity that it would never be evaluated in a calmer atmosphere. Abramowitz, supra note
165.
1 Department of Health and Human Services, HHS News (Nov. 2, 1989) (discuss-
ing the continuation of a limited moratorium on federal funding of research on human
fetal tissue transplants; statement by Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of Health and
Human Services) (on file at the Boston University International Law Journal).
173 See Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 1989, at A5, col. 1 (discussing the ban on federal re-
search on fetal-tissue due to ethical and moral issues).
174 Id.
15 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3079 (1989).
178 Polls show 70% of Americans believe that abortion should be a decision for
women to make alone. Yet more than 50% also think the act to be inherently wrong.
According to a Los Angeles Times poll, 47 % approved of the Supreme Court's decision
in Webster, 40% disapproved, and 13 % were not certain. Cassidy, U.S. Abortion Rul-
ing Divides a Nation, The Sunday Times (London), July 9, 1989, at C4, col. 1.
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amble to the challenged statute declares human life to begin at conception'"
and defined conception as "the fertilization of the ovum of a female by a
sperm of a male"-in disregard of standard medical tests which equate con-
ception with uteral implantation occurring about six days after fertilization.7 8
Thus the statute not only sought impliedly to regulate pre-viable abortions, but
common forms of contraception such as the IUD and the morning-after-pill as
well. 117 9 Yet a majority of the Court held the preamble did not actually regu-
late abortion and therefore the scope of its application would have to await
testing until a concrete example restricting the appellees' activities was
shown.' 80 The majority of the court refused "[t]o decide . . . abstract
propositions. ... "1811
It is beyond the purpose of this Article to probe the permutations and inter-
stices of Webster. Suffice it to note that Webster strongly indicates that a clear
majority of the Justices are willing to depart from Roe v. Wade and thereby
curb, if not abolish, the constitutional right of a woman to have an abortion.
What is relevant to the present analysis is Justice Stevens' opinion in Web-
ster concurring in part and dissenting in part.'82 Stevens would find the Mis-
souri statute violated the establishment clause because of the legislative ("the-
ological") finding in the statute's preamble that endorses the state interest in
preserving the life of an embryo during the first forty or eighty days of preg-
nancy to be at the same level of protection and scrutiny as after viability.' 8'
Justice Stevens would also invalidate the statute because it violates the right of
177 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3047.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 3050. Reproductive Health Service, which brought the action against the
Missouri Attorney General, will not be affected by the Webster decision because it is a
private facility. Since such privately operated clinics perform 87% of all abortions,
Webster will have little impact. If a clinic is, however, on public land, Webster would
apply. Cassidy, supra note 176. See also American Survey: The Fearful Politics of
Abortion, THE ECONOMIST, July 8, 1989, at 31.
181 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050. The majority further held that Missouri's prohibi-
tion on use of public facilities as well as the use of public employees in the performance
of abortions was wholly consistent with the position the Court had established by its
prior rulings. Id. (citing Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 409
(1900)).
The viability testing provision of the statute requires physicians to determine fetal
viability if the pregnant woman is more than twenty weeks pregnant, If deemed viable,
the fetus may not be aborted unless its mother's life is in danger. The majority held
that this provision was consistent with the exercise of a physician's professional judg-
ment and complimentary to the state's interest in protecting human life. Id. at 3055.
A simple ultra sound examination can determine gestational age, fetal weight and
fetal lung maturity which in turn allows a physician to determine whether a fetus is
viable. Smith, Frey & Johnson, Assessing Gestational Age, 33 AM. FAM. PHYSICIANS
215, 219-20 (1986).
182 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3079-85.
183 Id. at 3081.
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contraceptive privacy set forth in Griswold v. Connecticut.218 Before reaching
this conclusion, however, he develops a thoughtful inquiry into the issue of
male versus female ensoulment articulated in the early writings of St. Thomas
Aquinas which have been accepted by the Roman Catholic Church. Justice
Stevens quotes extensively from a Report on Catholic Teaching on Abortion
prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.
The disagreement over the status of the unformed as against the formed
fetus was crucial for the Christian teaching on the soul. It was widely
held that the soul was not present until the formation of the fetus 40 or
80 days after conception, for males and females respectively. Thus, abor-
tion of the 'unformed' or 'inanimate' fetus (from anima, soul) was some-
thing less than true homicide, rather a form of anticipatory or quasi-
homicide. This view received its definitive treatment in St. Thomas Aqui-
nas and became for a time the dominant interpretation in the Latin
Church.
For St. Thomas, as for the medieval Christendom generally, there is a
lapse of time-approximately 40 to 80 days-after conception and before
the soul's infusion ....
For St. Thomas, 'seed and what is not seed is determined by sensation
and movement.' What is destroyed in abortion of the unformed fetus is
seed, not man. This distinction received its most careful analysis in St.
Thomas. It was the general belief of Christendom, reflected, for example,
in the Council of Trent (1545-1563), which restricted penalties for homi-
cide to abortion of an animated fetus only.185
What Justice Stevens concludes after analyzing the Aquinas position is most
important to a sophisticated understanding of the complex medico-legal-ethi-
cal issue of the scope of protection the state should or may extend to research
and experimentation of extracorporeal embryos. He states eloquently:
As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference between the state
interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in
protecting a 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth.
There can be no interest in protecting the newly fertilized egg from phys-
ical pain or mental anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does
not yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, however, that interest is valid.
In fact, if one prescinds the theological concept of ensoulment-or one
accepts St. Thomas Aquinas' view that ensoulment does not occur for at
least 40 days, a Stati has no greater secular interest in protecting the
potential life of a sperm or an unfertilized ovum.18
The logic of this position is quite compelling and provides much weight to
the position that while the embryo does not theologically have an independent
moral status, it is regarded by some as worthy of respect as a "symbol of
184 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
185 Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3083.
116 Id. (emphasis added).
[VOL. 8: 21
ASSISTED NONCOITAL REPRODUCTION
life."'x87 While the embryo might well be treated as "an object of respect," it
arguably does not-consistent with this position-gain any type of moral sta-
tus or recognition until transferred to a uterus. 188 Accordingly, when no trans-
fer occurs, vexatious decisions concerning unused or stored embryos "become
occasions to use embryos as a symbol of life or persons generally" are
presented.189 What then must be evaluated is whether the need for preserving
such symbols outweighs "the costs to antonomy or future knowledge that sym-
bol-making necessarily involves."'9 0
Justice O'Connor, in concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
addressed the concern that the preamble to the challenged statute might pro-
hibit the development and use of IVF by dismissing them as "intimations of
unconstitutionality" that were "simply too hypothetical" to address.' 9' Re-
garding the challenge that the statute is violative of Griswold, she found noth-
ing in the preamble that would affect a woman's right to practice acts of
contraception.19'
Justice O'Connor stressed that, as to the state's interest in protecting poten-
tial life, the point of viability was the crucial determination when such interest
could be focused by the enactment of regulations designed to achieve that
end. 9 3 "No decision of this Court has held that the State may not directly
promote its interest in potential life when viability may differ with each preg-
nancy." 94 Its "possibility" can thus be determined within a period of test-
ing-as for example here with Missouri's twenty week period (that was essen-
tially a presumption of viability at twenty weeks-subject to medical
rebuttal). 95 As more advanced medical technologies develop, the testing pe-
riod may commence earlier. Yet, even with an earlier time frame for testing
viability, it is well known that fetal lungs do not mature until some thirty-
three to thirty-four weeks of gestation. 98 The physician is also aided in the
"87 Robertson, Extracorporeal Embryos and the Abortion Debate, 2 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH. L. & POL'Y 53, 59-60 (1986).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 60.
190 Id. See also Robertson, Procreative Liberty and The Control of Conception,
Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983). See generally, Smith & Iraola,
Sexuality, Privacy and The New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 263 (1984); SMITH, Qual-
ity of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63 NEB. L. REV. 709
(1984).
19 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3059.
192 Id.
'93 Id. at 3062 (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecol-
ogists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).
194 Id.
195 Id at 3061.
198 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3063.
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determination of viability by ultra sound examinations that determine gesta-
tional age and fetal weight, as well as fetal lung maturity.
9 7
The full Court chose not to address the validity of the statute's preamble
that recognized life as beginning with human conception. However, the argu-
ments made by Justices Stevens and O'Connor regarding viability and the
tone of the other opinions in the case persuasively show that legal protection of
personhood under present accepted biological and medical knowledge ought
not be extended to unimplanted, extracorporeal embryos. When implanted, as
with normal conception, the embryo must develop into a viable fetus before
full state protections will be accorded to it. 98
VI. CONCLUSION
In exploring the noncoital reproductive sciences, a balance should be struck
between the unfettered use of science for individual satisfaction and the pro-
motion and maintenance of the social good. Thus, embryo research and experi-
mentation which contributes to the goal of minimizing human suffering and
maximizing the social good deriving therefrom must be pursued in a reasona-
ble manner. So long as the central driving force in marital relationships con-
tinues to be procreation and the family unit remains at the core of a progres-
sive society, efforts will be pursued which seek to expand the period of
fecundity, combat infertility and assure that inherited genetic deficiencies are
not passed on to future generations. Genetic experimentation and planning, in
conjunction with eugenic programming, are more rational and humane than
alternatives to population regulation through death, famine and war or an ab-
dication of genetic autonomy to the countervailing doctrines of gene sover-
eignty and biological determinism. 99
Socially responsible scientific inquiry should be restrained only when the
scientist "is clearly able to foresee that the particular line of work is leading to
a kind and scale of dangers" that would constitute a "limitation;" or, in other
117 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Webster District Court found uncon-
tradicted medical evidence that a 20- week-old-fetus was not viable, and furthermore,
that the earliest point in pregnancy where a reasonable possibility of viability exists was
between 23 to 24 weeks of gestation. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3055. However, the
district court also recognized that there was a four week margin of error in determining
gestational age, thus giving support for the commencement of testing at 20 weeks. 662
F. Supp. 407, 420 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
In Roe, which is still controlling, the Court acknowledged that viability was "usually
placed" at or around seven months (or twenty eight weeks), but on occasion may occur
as early as twenty-four weeks.
"Il See generally Smith, Intimations of Life: Extracorporeality and The Law, 21
GONz. L. REV. 395 (1986).
199 Smith, The Province and Function of Law, Science and Medicine: Leeways of
Choice and Patterns of Discourse, 10 U. NEW So. WALES L.J. 103, 123 (1987).
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words, presents "dangers of cataclysmic physical or psychological proportions
for mankind as a whole."20°
While some would view research and experimentation in human embryology
and reproductive biology as promoting a genetic disaster or cataclysm, the bet-
ter view is that such work advances the goal of minimizing human suffering
and maximizing the quality of purposeful and meaningful existence free of
inherited genetic disabilities.2"' Certain aspects of the new human reproduc-
tive biology (e.g., cloning) might well require greater degrees of reasonable
self-restraint. By and large, however, the nature and degree to which restraint
is mandated must be determined by the individual scientist.
Preemption of scientific work in human reproductive biology by the state is
short-sighted and repressive of the principle of free scientific inquiry.202 In-
stead of developing a scientific regulatory scheme relying on legislative prohi-
bition, rule-making committees within the pertinent medical and scientific pro-
fession should be established to monitor and control scientific inquiry. Perhaps
the best model would be a simple organization approached easily on a consult-
ative and advisory basis and designed to assist biologist, scientist and medical
researchers make their own decisions.20 3
Included in the Health Research Extension Act of 1985204 were provisions
to create a Biomedical Ethics Board and a Biomedical Ethics Advisory Com-
mittee to report on human genetic engineering and on the federal rules on
human fetal research.20 5 If totally funded, the Committee will also study the
ethical, social, and legal implications of human genome mapping, genetic test-
ing, eugenics and gene therapy.206 These bodies would perhaps provide some
continuity with the now defunct President's Commission for The Study of Eth-
ical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research by ad-
vancing efforts to study, evaluate and organize responses to the new reproduc-
tive biology.
It remains for lawyers to become more aware and, indeed, educated to the
challenges and complexities of these new scientific and technological advances
in reproductive biology. If they fail to achieve this level of awareness and edu-
cation, "they will increasingly lack understanding of the questions to be asked,
200 Stone, Knowledge, Survival and The Duties of Science, 3 AM. U. L. REV. 231,
240 (1973).
201 See generally, Delgado & Miller, God, Galileo and Government: Toward Consti-
tutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry in 1 ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHAL-
LENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD at 231 (G. Smith ed. 1982).
202 See Nelkin, Threats and Promises: Negotiating the Control of Research, 107
DAEDALUS 191 (1978).
203 See Edwards & Sharpe, Social Values and Research in Human Embryology,
231 NATURE 87, 90 (1971).
204 Health Research Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-158, 99 Stat. 820
(1985).
205 Capron, Bioethics on The Congressional Agenda, HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 22
(1989).
20 Id. at 23.
1990]
52 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 8: 21
let alone answers to be given."207 And, one such open-ended question remains:
To what extent, if at all, there is a fundamental constitutional or international
human right for procreative liberty, health assistance in biological reproduc-
tion, and the point in the biological developmental chart that mandates the
state to extend its protection to "life."
While ever mindful of the perhaps unavoidable mixture of religion into sci-
ence and the new laws of reproductive biology, every step must be taken to
assure as pragmatic a view as possible is adhered to in the ultimate structuring
of legislative responses and judicial interpretation. Scientific objectivity, if not
verifiability, should be not an ideal but a given in this area of decision making.
The legislative approaches taken by the European Parliament, the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the State of Victoria, Australia, run astray of scientific
pragmatism. It remains to be seen whether the United States will follow this
direction. The sad indications are that it will.
207 Kirby, Human Rights-The Challenge of The New Technology, 60 AusT. L.J.
170, 181 (1986).
